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Abstract 
 
This paper models strategic interactions between a product supplier, a provider of information about 
product quality, and end users, in the context of road transportation. Using a game-theoretical analysis of 
suppliers’ pricing strategies, we assess the social welfare effects of traffic information under various road 
markets with different ownership regimes. The results show that in this context, the distortive welfare 
effect of monopolistic information pricing appears small to negligible. Collusion of the road operator and 
information provider yields higher social welfare than independent pricing by two firms. The intuition 
behind this result resembles that behind the welfare effects of double marginalization, but it is not exactly 
the same, as traffic information is not strictly complementary to road use. 
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1. Introduction 
Stochastic variation in product quality is common in many markets. Often the exact 
quality realization is unknown to buyers before the purchase. For instance, in a book or wine 
shop a buyer may not be perfectly aware of the quality of the product – a book could be 
interesting or not, bottles of wine could be good or not. Some consumers buy products anyway. 
Others execute a demand for numerous Internet blogs and specialized journals that advise 
audience on the “genuine” product value. 
Transportation markets fit well into the above description. Due to the stochastic nature of 
travel, the exact travel time on a particular route in a network may be unknown to drivers a 
priori. That is, car accidents that block the street, bridge openings, weather conditions, etc., 
might slow down traffic in an unpredictable way. Information and telecommunication 
technologies (ICT) can then potentially support drivers with more reliable data on the duration of 
travel before the decision to make the trip is made. 
The primary goal of this study is to assess the social welfare effects of the provision of 
information about product quality in the context of road transportation. Specifically, we show 
how the strategic behavior of market agents, depending on market ownership regimes, affects 
social welfare. We consider a game-theoretical setup of the market where a road operator, an 
information provider, and atomistic end users coexist. The information provider reports an actual 
quality value of a product, in our case that is the time necessary to make the trip. Conditional on 
the prices for road use and information, the rational consumers decide whether to travel or not, 
and whether to purchase information or not. A similar model could describe other markets with a 
supplier of a core product of variable quality, information supply and atomistic users. 
We construct a simple model with elastic demand for and stochastic user costs of travel, 
and endogenous demand for traffic information. Depending on the price of information, the 
demand for travel might vary, thus affecting the possible profit and welfare of the road operation. 
In turn, an increase of a road toll forces more consumers to abstain from a trip, and hence limits 
the demand for information. Therefore, the information price affects the demand for travel and 
the price of travel affects the demand for information. The identification and welfare analysis of 
product/information price interdependence is a main contribution of this paper. 
We study several related questions: Should the information be provided by a public or a 
private company? How does the expected number of trips change if a private information 
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provider starts operating in the market? Should the road operator also own information provision, 
or is this bad for society? To answer these questions, we assess the effect of information 
provision by analyzing nine market forms with different ownership regimes, and compare the 
social welfare they generate. 
Markets with limited information availability have since long been in the focus of 
economists (Stiglitz, 2000). The seminal paper by Stigler (1961) is the first attempt to outline the 
economic reasoning behind information acquisition. He uses the term “search” to describe a 
price survey conducted by buyers among sellers of a homogeneous product. He notes that the 
optimal amount of “search” might be computed by equating its marginal cost with its marginal 
benefit. Kihlstrom (1974) looks specifically at the demand for information about product quality. 
His model covers factors behind the demand for information of utility-maximizing consumers 
under a budget constraint. However, the exogeneity of the price of information leaves no room 
for strategic considerations of the market agents. Salop (1977) points out that a producer might 
discriminate buyers who are more efficient information-gatherers by means of price dispersion. 
In a similar way Kehoe (1996) links the level of consumers’ uncertainty about the product 
quality to the product monopolistic price. But the markets they model lack a separate information 
provider, while in the case of quality dispersion that we consider in this paper, the cost of 
independent individual information collection is assumed to be prohibitively high for consumers. 
The model by Lizzeri (1999), on the strategic behavior of a certification intermediary, 
looks at a market with an independent information firm that is hired by a supplier to truthfully 
testify the randomly assigned quality of a product to buyers. He demonstrates that the private 
information firm might have incentives not to disclose all information it possesses to the buyers 
in order to get a contract from a supplier. In his setup, an information provider is a Stackelberg 
leader. That precludes a feedback effect of the supplier’s pricing behavior on the information 
provider’s one. In our model we track Nash behavior. Besides, unlike Lizzeri (1999), we allow 
for an elastic product demand, which makes the set of possible pricing strategies more realistic. 
In our model, none of the agents can affect the quality of its performance, as we restrict our 
attention to the price dimension only. Thus, the information provider delivers the exact traffic 
information, while a road operator can not influence the traffic conditions of the road network.  
We will assume that the core road supplier does not adjust the prices depending on the 
product quality. This is either because the supplier himself is unaware of the precise product 
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quality on a specific day, or it may lack a fine pricing mechanism. This setup suits a road 
transport market well, as even if a road operator knows the traffic conditions, it might not be able 
to change a road toll accordingly. Travelers might dislike road toll variations, and to make a road 
pricing acceptable, the road operator might be constrained to a fix toll.
1
  
Advanced Traveler Information Systems (ATIS) is a concrete example of ICT 
implementation in transportation. Papers by Emmerink et al. (1996), Verhoef et al. (1996), de 
Palma and Lindsey (1998), Yang (1999), Zhang and Verhoef (2006), and Fernandez et al. (2009) 
investigate the effect of free of charge ATIS on drivers’ decision to travel. They appraise 
efficiency inputs of information when road pricing is or is not in place. These papers allow for 
negative external effects of individual travel, i.e. congestion. Often, indeed, negative congestion 
externalities are taken into account in the transportation literature. Given our primary focus on 
strategic interactions between suppliers, we assume that the road network is uncongestible. 
Theoretically, both public and private providers internalize the negative externalities into the 
road toll (Small and Verhoef, 2007). The difference between the pricing rules is that the latter 
would impose a demand-related mark-up, which increases if demand becomes less elastic. By 
setting the external marginal cost to zero, we still preserve the monopolistic mark-up on top of 
the first-best charge in the model, so the main difference between private and public supply is 
maintained in our analysis. But the feedback effects on congestion levels are ignored. 
Emmerink et al. (1998) explicitly derive the demand for information from the elastic 
travel demand. We follow their approach in the set-up of the model and extend it by considering 
pricing behavior of the road operator and information provider. Zhang and Verhoef (2006) show 
the effect of monopolistic traffic information on welfare for a one-link toll-free road network. 
This paper, to the best of our knowledge, is the first to consider a multiple-link market with an 
elastic travel demand, and independent road and information suppliers. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 More generally, if the price reveals the exact quality, traffic information is relevant only when the road toll is not 
yet known on the moment the route is chosen, or travelers respond to the expected road price only. Our analysis may 
be taken to consider an undifferentiated toll, or the expected value of a differentiated toll, the value of which is 
known by the travelers only after the route is chosen. 
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2. Model 
2.1 Travel demand and supply 
We consider a road network of     parallel routes connecting one origin and one 
destination. Drivers are willing to make a trip if the benefits of it are at least equal to the costs, 
otherwise they stay home (or use alternative transport not explicitly modeled). We impose a 
linear inverse demand function for travel of the form       , where   is the number of 
drivers. A driver’s j individual travel benefit is  
       , where    is the number of drivers 
with the higher travel benefit than driver j. 
The cost of the trip without delays    is constant and includes car depreciation, fuel and 
time costs. This cost function choice has several implications. First, there are no externality 
effects in the network. Second, it implies that we assume that people are homogenous with 
respect to value of time. Finally, all routes are identical in terms of expected generalized costs. 
This is required for parallel routes to attract travelers both with and without information. 
Possible delays due to, for instance, road accidents blocking the way or other incidents, 
make the travel cost stochastic. With probability   the cost of the trip increases from    to   . 
The probability of simultaneous incidents occurring on all   roads is   . Drivers are perfectly 
aware of the possible cost levels and the probability associated with them, and rationally estimate 
expected travel cost as          –        when being uninformed. 
The road operator, which may be either welfare or profit maximizing, owns the whole 
network and takes its structure as given. Assuming no deterioration of the roads, the operator’s 
marginal cost is zero. Using this static setup, we will next derive drivers’ willingness to pay for 
information in the next subsection. 
 
2.2 Demand for information 
Traffic information is the information about the costs of travel. While still at home, the 
driver gets access to perfectly reliable information and observes what the costs of travel on each 
of the   routes are. Afterwards, the driver chooses whether to travel and if so, which route to 
take. If at least on one of the routes the cost of travel is lower than the benefit, the driver makes a 
trip on such a route. If the cost on all routes is higher, the driver abstains from a trip. We assume 
no incident can happen on the way – i.e., all information is accurate. Our key interest in this 
section lies in how much drivers are willing to pay for information.  
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Figure 1a. Demand and stochastic costs of travel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The willingness to pay for information of driver j (hereafter    
 ) is the difference 
between the expected consumer surpluses for informed and uninformed traveling. When traffic 
information is not available, driver j compares the expected cost      with her benefit of 
traveling  
 , and then decides whether to travel or not. In the case when information is available, 
the expected consumer surplus depends on the relative strength of the benefit   
  in comparison    
to costs   ,      and   , in a way to be explained below.2 Due to the assumed linearity of the 
travel demand, it results in a piecewise linear function of willingness to pay for information. 
                                                          
2
 One might also consider the cost of uncertainty, i.e. the cost of not knowing what the actual cost of the trip will be. 
It manifests itself in a psychological discomfort of a drive, in an inability to schedule the agenda properly and so on. 
The cost of uncertainty might be the part of generalized cost of travel only for uninformed travelers. For informed 
drivers the cost of uncertainty is zero. Inclusion of homogeneous value of uncertainty across people does not affect 
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To understand the shape of the function of the willingness to pay for information, we first 
examine the section of the travel demand where  
    . No matter what the costs are, drivers 
with benefits higher or equal to    are always willing to travel, either with or without 
information. Of course, they prefer to incur the lowest cost possible, so they use information to 
make a better route choice to avoid delays. When informed, they face a cost    in a fraction 
 –    of the cases, compared to  –   when uninformed. Thus, the expected cost of informed trip 
is         –             , where     is the price of information. The maximum price 
that driver j is willing to pay for information,    
 , conditional on her travel benefit  
    , is: 
 
    
                        (1) 
 
Note that    
  does not depend on individual willingness to pay for travel,  
 . The benefit of 
information in this case is solely a route choice benefit, which is a function of the cost of a 
delay      , and the rate at which information helps avoid this delay,     . Besides, the 
expected number of trips is the same both with and without information, as drivers are always 
willing to travel irrespective of the travel cost. 
Next, consider the segment of the travel demand where      
      . Without 
information drivers always make the trip, although in a fraction   of the cases they face cost   , 
which is higher than their benefit  
 . Nevertheless, in terms of expected consumer surplus, 
travel does pay off. With information, drivers abstain from travelling in a fraction    of the 
cases. The lower their travel benefit, the higher this information benefit is, as the drivers save 
more. Thus, on top of a “route choice benefit”, defined by equation (1), there is a “participation 
benefit”. A participation benefit is the benefit one gets by changing the decision of whether to 
make a trip or not. In contrast to the route choice benefit, the participation benefit depends 
on  
 . The expected consumer surplus is    
       –      . The willingness to pay for 
information of driver j, conditional on demand      
      , is: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the results substantially. For the clarity of exposition we omit it. De Palma and Picard (2008) explicitly include 
heterogeneous risk-aversion into the evaluation of information value. 
 
 
8 
 
    
                        
       (2) 
 
For this segment of travel demand,    
  is increasing with decrease of  
 , because the 
participation benefit increases as  
  becomes smaller. The expected number of trips with 
information is always lower than without information, because informed drivers do not 
participate in a fraction    of the cases. 
Now, we look at the third part of the travel demand where        
    . These 
drivers do not travel without information, as the expected cost exceeds the benefit. However, 
information makes it beneficial to travel in a fraction  –    of the cases. The expected cost and 
benefit are the same as in the case before. So,    
 , conditional on demand        
    , is: 
 
    
                      
         (3) 
 
Here    
  is decreasing with a decline of  
 , because the participation benefit decreases. The 
expected number of trips with information is always higher than without information (when it is 
zero).  
The last part of the demand function, where      
 , is not relevant for our discussion, 
as these drivers will never travel and traffic information is of no use for them. 
Figure 1a shows the original demand and supply setup, while Figure 1b illustrates the 
result of the derivation of      just discussed. The drivers between   and   gain both a route 
choice and participation benefit of information, with driver   having the highest    
 , as she 
obtains the maximum participation benefit. Drivers to the left-hand side of   enjoy a route 
choice benefit as given by (1). Drivers to the right-hand of   have a participation benefit only. 
Figure 1b shows    
  for each driver, ordered according to the inverse demand curve 
from Figure 1a. However, the inverse demand function for information represents the 
relationship between the price of information   and the number of drivers willing to be 
informed  . Note that for the price     , which corresponds to the highest    
 , there is only 
one person, namely  , willing to acquire information. By changing the order of individuals we 
transform Figure 1b into 1c, the latter being the conventional inverse demand function for 
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information. Using expressions (1), (2) and (3) we derive this inverse demand for 
information,  , of the following form:  
 
    
                                          
                               
                                     
    (4) 
 
3. Pricing 
3.1 Independent pricing 
In this subsection we consider for both suppliers (i.e., the road operator and the 
information provider) private profit-maximizing and public welfare-maximizing pricing. In the 
next subsubsection we look at monopolistic information pricing when the road network is toll-
free. Then, we consider a road operator’s price when information is available free of charge. 
Subsection 3.2 focuses on the interdependence of the pricing behavior of profit-maximizing 
firms. Subsection 3.3 derives the welfare-maximizing pricing strategies. 
 
3.1.1 Information pricing 
An information provider sets either the welfare or the profit maximizing price of 
information. Figure 2 shows the demand for and the marginal revenue (hereafter mr) of 
information. For simplicity we set the marginal cost (hereafter mc) of information provision at 
zero. It is plausible that also in reality, given available technologies, after substantial fixed and/or 
sunk costs investments, the distribution of information to individual drivers is virtually costless. 
One might think of a subscription to a digital service. Moreover, below we show that the 
introduction of a positive mc does not affect the further analysis fundamentally, as long as it is 
sufficiently low. 
The kinked information demand function derived in the previous section implies a kinked 
and discontinuous marginal revenue function for information. Let   be the price level of the first 
kink of the mr function. As long as mc  , the only intersection of mr and mc corresponds to 
the    level of demand, as it is easy to show that     
                  is always
10 
 
Figure 2. Demand for (bold line) and marginal revenue (dash line) of information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
positive.
3
 That results in a profit-maximizing price   , equal to the route choice benefit. A 
welfare-maximizing information provider, in contrast, would set the price to zero, the marginal 
cost. 
Interestingly, the introduction of the information with a price      does not change the 
expected number of trips made in the network (this holds for      as well). It is easy to prove 
that the decrease in the number of expected trips by the drivers between   and   (see Figure 
1b) is exactly offset by an increase in the number of expected trips by the drivers between   
and  .
4
 The first   drivers keep their overall number of trips constant. This exact insensitivity 
of the expected number of trips depends on the assumed linearity of travel demand. 
 
3.1.2 Road pricing 
In absence of wear and tear or any other marginal cost, the welfare maximizing road 
operator lets every driver use the road network without a charge, so that        . That holds 
true both when information is not available and when its price is zero. The objective of the 
                                                          
3
 It is also possible that the intercept of the mc and mr is to the right of  , i.e. a price level of the last kink of the mr 
function,  , is positive (                             ). However, the necessary condition for   to be 
positive is        , which might hold only when       and    . For any practical purpose a probability of 
an incident on one route larger than 50 percent is hardly realistic, so we do not consider it in the analysis. 
4
 Using equations (2) and (3), one can show that the road use declines by  
      
 
 for all drivers to the left from   if 
the information price drops from     to   . For all drivers to the right from   the road use increases by exactly 
the same amount. 
mr 
D 
Nc - Na 
      
  
Nd 
Price and marginal revenue 
of information 
Informed drivers 
 
    
  
Nc 
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Figure 3. A road operator profits under various tolls with free information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
profit-maximizing firm is to price the road use in a way that maximizes its profit function    . 
When traffic information is not available to the drivers, the operator sets a road toll   
      
 
. 
If free information is available to the drivers, the profit function of the road operator 
might fail to be quasi-concave. As this complicates deriving an analytical solution for the profit- 
maximizing road toll, we will run numerical simulations. First we give the intuition behind this 
point. 
The road operator faces two pricing options, one of which is characterized by a zero road 
use in the high-cost state. A low road toll         
  insures that the drivers with a high 
willingness to pay for travel (i.e.  
      ) would always travel, while others travel in a 
fraction      of the cases. A high toll               
 , implies that there are only 
travelers driving in a fraction      of the cases. Figure 3 illustrates these two alternatives, the 
shaded areas representing road operator profits. Depending on the exact specifications 
of            the firm will prefer either the profit under toll      or that under toll      . 
Assume that probability p is 50 percent, so that the shaded areas under      are equally 
weighted. Then, as Figure 3 suggests, a road toll       yields the highest profit. However, if the 
cost    would be higher or if   would be steeper, then the road toll      might results in a 
higher profit. 
Figure 4 shows a hypothetical profit function that is not quasi-concave. Here, a road 
toll         
  creates the highest profit. To identify the profit-maximizing road toll for a 
profit function that is not quasi-concave, one should check all stationary points and all corner 
solutions (Wolfstetter, 1999, p.13). 
Travel demand and costs 
 
     
     
      
      
  
   
Informed drivers 
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Figure 4. A hypothetical road operator profit function     with free information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Interdependence of information and road pricing 
In the previous two subsubsections we considered information and road pricing 
independently from one another. A closed-form solution exists for the profit-maximizing 
information price  , and a road operator was found to check for the profit-maximizing price   in 
the set of local maxima and corner solutions. In both cases, the price of the other service was 
assumed to be equal to zero. Now we examine how the inclusion of the positive road toll affects 
the optimal price of information and vice versa. Effectively, we estimate the reaction functions, 
also known as best-response, of a private road operator and a private information provider. The 
reaction function of an information provider is a profit-maximizing price   as a function of a 
road price  , and the other way around for the road operator. 
 
3.2.1 Reaction function of the information provider 
We start with the calculation of the information provider’s reaction function (see Figure 
5). We let some part of the inverse travel demand exceed the highest costs when the road toll is 
zero, i.e.     . As shown above, if the road toll is zero, the firm optimal price of information 
is always    (given the reservations made in footnote 2). 
  When increasing the road toll by       ,    in Figure 1b shifts left. The number of 
drivers to the right-hand side of   stays the same, although these are now different people, i.e., 
they have a different willingness to pay for travel. The constancy of       is due to the 
assumed linearity of the travel demand. The shape of the information demand remains 
unchanged, apart from the horizontal segment being reduced. As long as there are some drivers 
              
  
     Road operator 
profit,      
Road toll,   
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Figure 5. Reaction function of the information provider 
 
 
 
 
 
willing to travel in both states of nature, an information provider finds it most profitable to set 
the price equal to the route choice benefit   . Thus, the profit-maximizing information price is 
constant, given       . 
When the road toll is so high that no informed driver travels always, the information 
provider has an incentive to increase  . An increase of the road toll reduces the amount of 
drivers, but those drivers who still travel have a relatively high participation benefit. That is due 
to the increasing cost of possible travel when there are delays on all routes,     . In these 
circumstances, information becomes more valuable, as it helps to avoid the costs of an 
unbeneficial trip. That makes it appealing for the information firm to increase  . Hence, the 
reaction function in Figure 5 slopes upward beyond     . 
Figure 6a illustrates how an increase of a road toll from        to     (to be 
defined below) shifts the willingness to pay for information function leftward. The order of the 
road users in Figure 6a corresponds to the order of drivers in the demand for travel. Figure 6b 
reorders those users, by     
 , to depict the inverse demand function for information. 
The higher the road toll, the smaller the number of drivers with both a route choice and 
participation benefit of information. Technically, after reaching the toll   (see below), the level 
of the second kink of mr function   becomes positive (see Figure 6b). From this point onward, a 
profit-maximizing information price declines with the road toll, to capture consumer surplus of 
drivers who have only a participation benefit. Thus, the reaction function kinks for the second 
time. Figures 6a and 6b show the way a raise of the road toll from        to   increases 
information price from    to   , where   and    are: 
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Those values are derived by using information demand equation (4) and calculating mr functions 
when    . The kinked shape of the information provider’s reaction function depicts an 
interesting relationship between   and  . For some of a road toll,           , the 
information price is strategically neutral. For a short range,             , it is a strategic 
complement; and for the rest,             , it is a strategic substitute. 
 
Figure 6a. Willingness to pay for information 
when        (regular line) and when   
  (bold line) 
Figure 6b. Demand (solid lines) and mr 
(dashed lines) for information when     
   (regular line) and when     (bold line)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Reaction function of the road operator 
It is somewhat more involved to identify the reaction function of a road operator, as it 
does not have a single closed-form solution. Nevertheless, one might distinguish two relevant 
closed-form solutions. Here we briefly outline them, and provide the intuition behind their main 
characteristics. 
         
 
      
 
Price of information 
Informed 
drivers 
Informed 
drivers 
Willingness to pay for information 
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As already discussed in the previous section, a road operator considers two possible 
alternatives for a profit-maximizing road toll  : a relatively low road toll,         
 , and a 
higher toll,               
 . The resulting profits can be composed numerically. 
First, focus on the low road toll         
 . Think of an extreme case when the price 
of information is prohibitively high, i.e.       . Since there are no drivers willing to acquire 
expensive information, the profit function of the road operator has the following form: 
 
    
        
 
          (5) 
 
Note that this is identical, not surprisingly, to the profit function under the no information 
regime.  
Next, imagine that the information price drops to the level          , with    equal 
to the route choice benefit. Now there are drivers who find it attractive to buy information. 
However, with a linear travel demand, it is easy to show that the expected number of trips will 
stay unchanged. Some drivers who did not travel without information will now travel in a 
fraction      of the cases. Some drivers who traveled without information will now stay home 
in a fraction    of the cases. The numbers of drivers involved in these two categories have a 
ratio          , as can be seen from equations (2) and (3). Overall, the amount of newly 
generated trips will, therefore, be exactly the same as the number of abstained trips.  
Information provision under price           will increase the consumer surplus of 
informed drivers by    
   . However, a road operator is unable to skim off a part of the 
additional consumer surplus into a profit, as that would imply an increase of the road toll 
above     . As the expected number of trips is the same, one can show that the profit function, 
as given by equation (5), is not affected by the decrease of  .  
At the price level   , those drivers with high travel demand        will purchase 
the information to get a route choice benefit. Nevertheless, their acquaintance with information 
does not affect the road operator’s profit, as these drivers do not change their travel decisions, 
since they always travel. At the price    these newly informed drivers do not obtain a higher 
consumer surplus. As long as     , the road operator’s profit function does not depend on the 
information price, given         
 . 
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Figure 7. Possible reaction functions of an information provider and a road operator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, a further decrease of the information price, so that     , prompts a change 
and the road operator’s reaction function kinks (see Figure 7). Drivers who previously did not 
travel (to the right of   in Figure 1b) will start buying information and will now travel in a 
fraction      of the cases. Already informed drivers will gain a larger consumer surplus from a 
route choice benefit, exceeding  , which a road operator is now able to internalize. The profit 
function of the road operator     , conditional on the toll         
  and     , is: 
 
           
           
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
        (6) 
 
Note that the second term on the right hand side of the equation (6) is the amount of trips the 
drivers make when the price of information and the road toll are low. 
           
 
 is the number of 
drivers willing to travel in low-cost state when the price of information is zero. 
         
 
 is the 
number of trips which drivers will abstain from in a fraction    of all cases. 
 
 
 is a number of 
drivers who will not be present in the market with a positive information price, compared to free 
information case. The profit-maximizing road toll for the profit function (6) 
is   
                
 
. As the price of information goes down, the road toll rises to capture the 
growing consumer surplus.  
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Information provider 
reaction function 
Road operator 
reaction function 
Price of information,   
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The reaction function of a road operator will look like the one depicted in Figure 7. This 
figure shows the reaction functions of both a road operator and an information provider, where 
the intersection is a pure Nash equilibrium. This pure Nash equilibrium is a stable trembling 
hand perfect one, because a small deviations from equilibrium, e.g. by mistake, would induce the 
agents to return to the equilibrium prices. 
Several outcomes of this Nash equilibrium follow immediately. First, as discussed before, 
the number of expected trips in the network under the no information regime and with profit-
maximizing road pricing is the same as under the Nash equilibrium. Second, the road toll and 
hence the profit of the road operator is the same as it is without information. Third, the drivers 
with high willingness to pay for travel       do not gain additional consumer surplus from 
the introduction of information, as the route choice benefit is exactly skimmed off by the 
information provider. 
Note that the set of reaction functions depicted in Figure 7 is only one of the possible 
alternatives. It assumes that                  , though this does not need to be true over the 
entire range of  . Figure 8 shows another possible reaction function of the road operator. Whilst 
the resulting equilibrium is identical to the one discussed above, the properties of the function are  
 
Figure 8. Possible reaction functions of an information provider and a road operator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
different. Most notably this function is discontinuous, which stems from the profit function not 
being quasi-concave, as illustrated in Figure 4. With a small change of the price of information 
the global maximum might change discontinuously from       to      (Rasmusen, 2006, p.97). 
The profit function     , conditional on the toll          
  and      is: 
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        (7) 
 
for the range of information price         , where    is the information price when the profit 
function (7) generates the same return as (6), i.e.                  . There are other 
possible solutions of the reaction functions (including mixed Bertrand-Nash equilibria), but we 
leave their exposition, as they are of limited practical relevance because they require rather 
unrealistic parameter values. 
 
3.3 Welfare-maximizing second-best pricing 
Free information and toll-free roads are natural benchmark cases if one considers public 
information provision and road operation. The conventional goal of a public agent is the overall 
social welfare maximization, on both markets in our case. By setting the road toll to zero, a 
public road operator insures efficient marginal cost pricing of the road operation in our model, 
but possible distortions of monopolistic information pricing remain unaddressed. A public road 
operator might want to subsidize road use, so as to compensate for an excessive private 
information price. And conversely, the public information provider might subsidize its service, to 
offset possible adverse impacts from monopolistic road pricing. In this subsection we look at 
these two cases.  
Importantly, subsidizing as a policy instrument requires some reservations. The 
government subsidies are funded via taxation, which itself might be welfare-distortive. In 
practice, the marginal effect of the subsidies should be compared with the marginal cost of public 
funds. We do not cover this issue here, and thus implicitly assume an existence of a welfare-
neutral lump-sum tax. 
 
3.3.1 Second-best road pricing 
When the road toll is zero, the profit-maximizing price of information is equal to the 
route choice benefit   . As a result, not everyone who would be informed under first-best 
information pricing is informed under a monopolistic one. That leads to inefficiency, as some 
drivers who lack information abstain from travel, while they would travel when they are 
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informed. To induce a higher road use, a public road operator might subsidize drivers by 
decreasing the cost of travel using the state-of-nature and driver independent subsidy    .  
The road use subsidy does not change the profit-maximizing price of information, as this 
price is solely determined by the route choice benefit   , defined by equation (1). And the route 
choice benefit    does not change, since the subsidy applies to both states of nature    and   . 
The subsidy then makes it beneficial for some drivers with demand        
     to start 
acquiring information and make trips. These drivers will travel as long as the price they pay for 
information is lower than the sum of their initial consumer surplus and a subsidy, i.e.    
(  − 0+ )1−  . Note that the road use subsidy is conditional on the actual trip, whereas the 
price for information is paid all the time, also when drivers stay home. The newly generated trips 
are welfare-enhancing, providing the consumer benefit that drivers derive from those trips is 
higher than the cost of travel, i.e.   
    .  
However, there is another group of drivers who alter travel behavior due to government 
intervention. Some drivers, who previously travelled in the fraction      of cases (under 
cost    only), will begin travelling always (also under cost   ), as  
      . This causes a 
welfare loss, as the consumer benefit they receive is lower than the cost of travel, i.e.  
     . 
Note that under monopolistic information pricing, the number of drivers who travel under 
cost    is optimal and any additional trips generate losses. This is true because the monopolistic 
information price    is such that it does not affect the participation decision of the drivers who 
travel all the time (drivers with travel demand  
    ). It is those drivers who should have 
been travelling under cost    are negatively affected by the monopolistic information pricing. 
Since a public road operator cannot separate these two groups, it needs to balance the welfare 
effects in order to achieve the highest additional welfare, while using a road subsidy as a second-
best welfare-maximizing instrument. For other drivers (i.e. in Figure 1a and 1b, the drivers to the 
left from  , and to the left from   until the point 
      
 
) the subsidy is a pure money transfer 
with no behavioral and social welfare effects. 
It is easy to prove that a subsidy   attains the highest additional welfare when it is equal 
to the route choice benefit   . Although subsidizing is beneficial for society, it cannot achieve 
the first-best outcome. When     , there are drivers who do not travel, as the price of 
information is too high, i.e.       
             . Interestingly, due to the linearity of 
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the travel demand function, the expected number of trips is the same as in the first-best scenario. 
But the composition of trips is different, i.e. some of those who in the first-best case should be on 
the road, never travel (due to the high information price), while some of those who should travel 
only in      percent of cases, travel all the time (due to the subsidy).  
 
3.3.2 Second-best information pricing 
When the price of information is zero, the profit-maximizing road operator uses profit 
functions (6) and (7) to set the road toll. Although everyone is informed, not everyone who 
would travel in the first-best scenario is willing to do so under a monopolistic road toll. Hence, a 
public information provider might intervene to partly correct for this market distortion. 
Consider a state-of-nature and driver independent information subsidy     that is given 
to everyone who travels at least sometimes. Not surprisingly, information subsidy as a welfare-
enhancing instrument achieves the first-best outcome when   is equal to the road toll. 
Predictably, the road operator responds to the subsidy by an increase of the road toll. The 
information subsidy matches the increased road toll until the point when the number of drivers 
using the road is equal to the first-best case. This setup resembles Stackelberg duopoly, where 
one firm is a leader (the profit-maximizing road operator) and another is a follower (welfare-
maximizing information provider).  
 
4. Numerical simulations 
We examine nine market forms of different ownership regimes. (1) “Base case: free road 
without ICT.” Drivers make decision based on the expectations of the cost values. (2) “Private 
road without ICT”. A lack of externalities makes road pricing a purely welfare-distortive market 
element. (3) “Private road with free ICT”. This is a case of a free public provision of 
information. If the information provider is unwilling or unable to insure excludability property of 
the information service, it becomes a public good. (4) “Free road with private ICT.” (5) 
“Bertrand-Nash” pricing when both road operator and information provider are private profit-
maximizing firms. (6) “First-best marginal cost pricing.” (7) “Private collusion” when a single 
monopolist owning both road network and traffic information about it. (8) “Private road with 
second-best ICT subsidy.” (9) “Private ICT with second-best road use subsidy.” 
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To analyze the welfare implications of the various road market arrangements, we use a 
parameterized numerical version of the model. We set the number of parallel identical routes   
 ; the cost of travel without a delay is normalized to      and the cost of travel with a delay 
is       . Probability of a delay on one route is       , which corresponds to one delay per 
4 trips. Demand elasticity,  , under expected cost level,     , is -0.4.5 To cast the discussion of 
the number of drivers, N, in terms of percentages of the basic equilibrium under     , N is equal 
to 100 in the reference equilibrium. Sensitivity analysis in the next section will illuminate the 
robustness of the main findings. 
The results of the baseline simulations are in Table 1. For each of the nine market forms 
we indicate both road toll and information price. The number of potential drivers shows the 
amount of drivers who would travel on the road in the low-cost state (  ), under the given road 
toll and information price. The number of expected trips either equals the number of potential 
drivers or is lower, because informed drivers with travel demand      
     abstain from the 
trip in    percent of time when the travel cost on all routes is   .  
We ignore fixed cost in our model. Profit from the information provision is therefore the 
product of the information price and the number of potential drivers. Note that not all drivers 
have to be informed – a driver might use a road network without buying information. 
Nevertheless, our simulation results show that every potential driver will acquire information, if 
information technologies are available, in the ownership regimes that we consider. As a general 
rule, to find profit from the information provision, we have to multiply the information price by 
the number of drivers willing to be informed. Profit from the road operation is given by the 
product of the road toll and the expected number of trips. 
We show consumer as well as producer surplus, the latter being the sum of information 
and road profits. We compute government spending on the subsidies in the last two market 
arrangements. Social welfare is the sum of consumer and producer surpluses minus government 
spending. The last row of Table 1 presents the ranking of the social welfare outcomes. 
The results are more informative if one reports the relative efficiency of the market 
setups,  , instead of the nominal values of social welfare. Following Arnott, et al. (1991),   is 
defined as: 
                                                          
5
 A long-term commuting car time elasticity in the EU is equal to -0.4 (Jong and Gunn, 2001). 
 22 
 
 
 
 Table 1. Characteristics of various market arrangements based on the baseline numerical estimations 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Market forms 
Base case: 
road without 
ICT 
First-best 
marginal  
cost pricing 
Private road 
without ICT 
Private road 
with free ICT 
Free 
road with 
 private ICT 
Bertrand-
Nash 
Private 
collusion 
Private  
road with 
public ICT 
subsidy 
Private 
ICT with  
public road  
use subsidy 
Information price NA FREE NA FREE 0.09 0.09 0.09 -2.94 0.09 
Road toll FREE FREE 1.41 1.45 FREE 1.41 1.36 2.94 -0.09 
Number of potential drivers 100.00 104.44 50.00 52.78 100.89 50.89 52.56 104.44 104.22 
Number of expected trips 100.00 103.33 50.00 51.67 100.00 50.00 51.67 103.33 103.33 
Information profit NA 0.00 NA 0.00 9.46 4.771 4.93 0.00 9.78 
Road profit 0.00 0.00 70.31 75.078 0.00 70.312 70.23 303.54 0.00 
Producer surplus 0.00 0.00 70.31 75.078 9.46 75.083 75.16 303.54 9.78 
Consumer surplus 140.62 150.42 35.16 37.80 140.79 35.32 37.71 150.42 150.32 
Government spending 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 303.54 9.69 
Social welfare 140.62 150.42 105.47 112.88 150.25 110.41 112.87 150.42 150.41 
Relative efficiency,   0 1 -3.59 -2.833 0.98 -3.09 -2.835 1 0.999 
Welfare rank 5 1 9 6 4 8 7 1 3 
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        (8) 
 
where    is the relative efficiency of the market setup i,           is the social welfare that 
market setup i generates,              is the social welfare that the reference market form 
produces (in our case it is “free road, no ICT” market) and            is the social welfare 
under first-best conditions (i.e. marginal cost pricing “free road, free ICT”). Hence,   equals 
zero in the reference equilibrium and equals one for the first-best market arrangement. A positive 
  indicates that the market setup performs better than the reference one. A negative   indicates 
a reduction in social welfare as compared to the reference case. 
Predictably, a market with a marginal cost pricing (“free road, free ICT”) generates the 
highest social welfare. The pool of potential drivers is the largest of all cases we consider. The 
number of expected trips is lower than the number of potential drivers, because in 6.25 percent of 
time drivers with travel demand      
     do not travel while being informed. 
A market with second-best information subsidies and private roads (“private road, ICT 
subsidy”) mimics the first-best welfare outcome. The information subsidy exactly compensates 
for the road toll, and hence fully covers the profit of the private road operator. Prices allow the 
same number of drivers and expected trips as in the first-best marginal cost pricing arrangement.  
A market with second-best road use subsidies and private information (“road subsidy, 
private ICT”) slightly lags behind the first-best. The road use subsidy,  , equals the information 
price, and almost all information profit is financed by subsidies. Note that producer profit is a bit 
larger than government spending, as drivers always buy information, but do not always travel 
and thus do not always receive subsidy. Hence, drivers have to pay the difference from their own 
money. Monopolistic information price prevents some drivers with willingness to pay for travel 
which is higher than    to make trips, therefore the number of potential drivers is lower than the 
first-best. As discussed before, due to the linearity of the travel demand function, the number of 
expected trips is the same as in the first-best. 
An untolled road network with private information provision (“free road, private ICT”) 
yields a social welfare close to the first-best market form. It is interesting to note that 
monopolistic information pricing has only a very small distortive impact on social welfare. In 
fact, the social welfare difference between the first-best “free road, free ICT” market and “free 
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road, private ICT” market is negligible in our parameterization. While private information 
decreases the consumer surplus, the decline is to a large extent offset by the producer surplus 
rise. The profit-maximizing information price is such that the resulting social welfare deadweight 
loss is rather small (in Figure 1c, the deadweight loss is the area below the demand curve to the 
right from  ).  
Comparison of the “free road, private ICT” market with “free road, no ICT” offers a nice 
illustration of the private ICT effect. The social welfare is lower in the market without 
information. Still, a lack of the information does not change the expected road use, while the 
number of potential drivers drops slightly. The consumer surplus decreases very little. In fact, 
most of the social benefits that information generates are skimmed off by the private information 
provider. Only drivers with travel demand       
     gain an additional consumer surplus. 
The consumer surplus gains of those drivers with the higher travel demand, equal to the route 
choice benefit, is fully internalized into the information provider’s profit.  
The non-existence of congestion in our model makes a positive road toll welfare-
distorting. The private road with free information is ranked the 6
th
 out of the 9 market forms we 
consider. The social welfare is substantially lower in comparison to the above mentioned 
markets.  
Somewhat surprisingly, the 7
th
 market arrangement in our ranking is the private collusion 
scenario, when one profit-maximizing firm controls both an operation of the road network and a 
provision of the traffic information about it. The Bertrand-Nash case performs worse in terms of 
social welfare. This effect resembles the double marginalization (originally due to Cournot, see 
an exposition in, for instance, Weyl, 2008), when a single monopolist charges a lower overall 
mark-up, compared to the joint effect of two separate, complementary firms mark-ups. But our 
case is slightly different.  
To remind, double-marginalization is the overpricing (above a monopoly price) which 
occurs when two complementary firms are setting prices independently with the goal to 
maximize their own profits.  The sum of the two prices is higher than the price that a single 
monopolist controlling both firms would charge, as the independent firms do not take into 
account the negative effects of their prices on the profit of the complementary firm. Double-
marginalization might occur when an upstream monopolist provides supply to a downstream 
monopolist, which, in turn, sells the product to the final users. Otherwise, double-marginalization 
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might also arise when two monopolists provide complementary products directly to the final 
user. The case of the road network and traffic information resembles the latter alternative, 
although it has a distinction. 
An important aspect of double-marginalization is the strict complementarity of the 
products, which road and traffic information do not have.  Road and traffic information are 
asymmetric products, as a driver can use the road without being informed, while it makes no 
sense to be informed without making any trips. Drivers choose voluntarily, depending on the 
information price, whether to access information or not. In case of standard double-
marginalization the two products should be acquired together and only the joint price determines 
the demand level which clears the market. In turn, in our case the price structure, i.e. shares of 
the road toll and information price in the overall monetary travel cost, determines the demand 
level as well.
 
Although not a standard case of double-marginalization, private road market with 
private ICT reveals similar phenomenon – independent road operation and information provision 
pricing leads to an overall mark-ups that exceeds the monopoly mark-up. That, consequently, 
leads to the social welfare level below that of a single monopoly. 
Referring back to the simulation results, the sum of the equilibrium information price and 
a road toll under a collusion scenario is equal to the equilibrium private road toll with free 
information (“private road, free ICT”).6 Although, the monetary costs are equal in those two 
cases, the cost composition is different. That leads to the difference in the number of potential 
drivers and, consequently, in the welfare levels.
7
 A monopolist attracts more potential drivers by 
setting a lower road toll. It trades off the profit from road toll with the profit from information 
provision. While some profit from the road operation will be lost, revenue from information 
provision does compensate for that loss. 
The least preferable market form from the social perspective is the private road without 
information. There are few potential drivers and the consumer surplus is the lowest of all. Note 
that the expected number of trips, the road toll and the profit of the road operator are the same as 
in the Bertrand-Nash oligopoly market.  
 
 
                                                          
6
 The equality holds true under specific parameter values, due to travel demand linearity. 
7
 Note that the expected number of trips is the same. 
 26 
 
6. Sensitivity analysis 
We now present a sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of the numerical results. 
We focus on the relative performance of the various road market arrangements in terms of social 
welfare as a function of two important model parameters. At first we look at the effect caused by 
the variation of the probability  . This variation shows the influence of the unreliability of the 
road network on social welfare. Then we vary the travel demand elasticity  .  
Ideally, we want to test the effect of one parameter change on the simulation results, 
keeping everything else the same. The initial reference market is the “free road, no ICT” case. 
By keeping the stochastic cost levels (   and   ) constant, an increase in incident probability   
causes the upward shift of the expected cost. Thus, the effect of unreliability is combined with 
and augmented by the variation in the expected travel cost. To keep the initial equilibrium the 
same (a number of potential drivers, elasticity level) we keep the expected cost constant while 
adjusting  . When we change probability, we move the stochastic cost levels simultaneously 
around the constant expected cost     . We keep the difference       constant.  
Figures 9 and 10 depict relative efficiency of the various markets in terms of ’s as a 
function of probability  . Note that the ranking of the welfare outcomes does not changes, which  
   
Figure 9. Relative efficiency of the market setups as a function of the delay probability  , 
               under constant expected cost      
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suggests the robustness of our findings. Figure 9 shows that “road subsidy, private ICT” market    
does well in comparison to the first-best. However, some drivers abstain from the trip due to the 
monopolistic information price. The relative efficiency decline is reflected in Figure 9 by a 
downward sloping   function. Note that the road subsidy compensates for some part of the 
information price inefficiency. When the chance of a delay is low, the number of drivers affected 
by the monopolistic information price is very small (in Figure 1b, these are drivers to the right 
from  ). But with an increase of   the number of abstaining drivers is getting higher, which 
reduces welfare. The lack of the road use subsidies makes “free road, private ICT” market to 
perform worse than the above mentioned ones, because there is no mechanism to compensate for 
the monopolistic information price. 
When the probability of a delay is very low or very high, the price of information is 
small. Everyone knows that a travel cost most of the time is cheap (  low) or expensive (  high), 
so there is little reason to pay a lot for information. When the probability of a delay approaches 
50 percent, the value of the information gets higher. The monopolistic pricing rule follows 
equation (1), i.e.             , which reaches the highest value at      . Because the 
information price is very small at the extreme   values, the road use subsidy, which equals the 
information price, does not notably affect the market performances. Thus, the performances of       
  
Figure 10. Relative efficiency of the market setups as a function of the delay probability  ,               
 under constant expected cost      
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the two markets converge.  
Figure 10 shows relative efficiencies of the other four markets. At extreme   values, 
when information has a relatively small impact on a market, the welfare levels are converging. 
All of the markets include a positive road pricing, thus, an absence of congestion results in 
welfare distortion as compared to the reference case “free road, no ICT”, making ’s negative. 
The shapes of all four relative efficiency functions are alike. In comparison to the first-best 
market all markets do relatively well when   is around 50 percent.  
Figures 11 and 12 show the relative efficiency of the markets as a function of travel 
demand elasticity. We obtain varying base-case elasticities by tilting the travel demand function 
around its intersection point with the expected cost function in the base equilibrium. Elasticities 
close to zero result in a very steep travel demand function. That makes the number of drivers 
willing to travel both under    and    costs relatively larger, and their consumer surplus bigger. 
There are relatively few drivers who might consider staying home when being informed when 
the cost of travel is   . When elasticity increases (in absolute terms), the demand function gets 
flatter. The consumer surplus shrinks, and more drivers might enjoy also a participation benefit 
of information, besides a route choice benefit, making information more valuable. The relative 
number of drivers who travel only when being informed increases with the rise of elasticity.  
For the main numerical simulations we assumed that the travel demand elasticity is -0.4. 
The variation of elasticities from -0.1 to -1.3 does not change the ranking of the market 
arrangements. As this is the empirically relevant interval (Jong and Gunn, 2001), the baseline 
ranking again appears to be robust. Figure 11 shows that markets with either road use or 
information public subsidies perform close to the first-best outcome. In the “free road, private 
ICT” market, with an increase of the absolute travel demand elasticity a private information 
provider sets higher monopolistic mark-up, as information becomes more valuable. Although, 
that decreases the market relative efficiency, the ranking is preserved. 
Figure 12 shows that all  ’s rise when demand becomes more elastic (except for “free 
road, no ICT” market which is by default always zero). The flatter the travel demand function, 
the larger is the share of drivers who would travel only when informed. ICT allows to attract 
those drivers to the road market, making social welfare, and hence omega, larger. In conclusion, 
the ranking is quite robust, strictly so in the empirically relevant range, and otherwise the 
difference is small. 
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Figure 11. Relative efficiency of the market setups as a function of travel demand elasticity   
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Relative efficiency of the market setups as a function of travel demand elasticity   
 
  
Note: * – for elasticities larger than |-1.5| we report expected omegas of the mixed Bertrand-Nash equilibria. 
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7. Summary and conclusions 
We study the welfare effects of information provision in the context of a market where 
potential drivers are facing a choice of whether to make a trip and if so, which route to take. Due 
to the stochastic travel time and hence cost, they are willing to pay for information about the 
actual travel time. From a travel demand-supply setup, we derived the endogenous demand for 
information. We showed the profit and welfare maximizing pricing strategies of both a road 
operator and an information provider, while accounting for the interdependency of those 
strategies. Using numerical simulations we examined nine market forms with different 
ownership regimes and compared the social welfare they generate. Sensitivity analysis proved 
the robustness of the main findings. 
The analysis sheds light on some welfare implications of information provision. 
Interestingly, it does not matter much whether the information is provided by a public or a 
private company. Because of the kinked shape of the endogenous demand for information, the 
dead-weight loss created due to the monopolistic mark-up is negligible. The dead-weight loss in 
the transport market is even smaller if the government can compensate for the inefficient 
information pricing with a public road use subsidy. In case the road operator is a profit-seeking 
firm, the Bertrand-Nash price equilibrium yields a lower social welfare in the market with 
private information provider, as compared to the market where information is free. But the 
difference in social welfares is not large. The main pricing strategy of the private information 
firm is to skim off the consumer surplus of those drivers who will travel irrespective of the travel 
costs, which requires an equalization of the information price to the route choice benefit. 
Essentially, the price mark-up hardly affects overall social welfare, but only redistributes some 
part of welfare from consumers to information monopolist. There are relatively few drivers who 
are left outside the market due to monopolistic information pricing. 
Secondly, the expected road use will remain the same in our linear model if a private 
information provider starts operating in the market. Most of the drivers will only change their 
route choice behavior and not forego trips altogether, as even the largest travel cost they might 
incur is lower than their willingness to pay for travel. Some informed drivers, nevertheless, will 
start abstaining from the trips when the travel costs are high on every road, as they will be better 
off by staying home than travelling. However, the number of abstained trips will be exactly 
offset by drivers who will start travelling when informed, conditional on the monopolistic price 
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of information. Interesting to note, a private road operator might not even notice the entry of the 
private information provider into the transport market. That is, the Bertrand-Nash price 
equilibrium in the “private road, private information” market might lead to the same expected 
road use, road toll and road operator’s profit as in the “private road, no information” market. 
Finally, it seems that private collusion is a better market arrangement than a market with 
independent profit-maximizing road and information operators. Traffic information is not a pure 
complementary product to road use. Nevertheless, similar to the double-marginalization case, the 
mark-up of a single monopolist is lower than the sum of two independent mark-ups. That leads 
to a higher social welfare under a monopolistic market form than under two separate firms. There 
appears, therefore, the little reason to prevent private road operators from offering paid 
information on traffic conditions on their roads. It is not true that this raises their market power 
and therefore induces higher prices than a split firm would charge. 
This paper is the first one to consider industrial organizational aspects of a market with a 
single core supplier (the road operator in our example), information provider, and end users. We 
showed how welfare effects of information introduction might vary depending on the market 
arrangement. There are, of course, several possible extensions one might consider to incorporate 
into the analysis. It seems natural to contrast the findings in this model with those in a model 
with congestion. It would also be interesting to relax the assumption of homogeneity of drivers 
with respect to value of time. One can expand the model by an introduction of sequential routes 
or a toll-free public route as an alternative to the private routes. Furthermore, a probability of 
delay and a cost of travel might be set as a function of a road operator’s investment. More 
research is therefore still needed to obtain a more comprehensive view of the effects of 
information provision on social welfare. 
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